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Abstract
T his paper aims at examining the ﬁ scal capacity of the EU by focusing on the Multiannual Financial Frameworks (MFFs). Taking into consideration the 
policy areas ﬁ nanced by the EU budget, the analysis draws on the MFFs 2007-
2013 and 2014-2020, and compares them with the proposed by the Commission 
MFF 2021-2027. The main objective is to shed light on the evolution of the MFFs 
by utilizing empirical data, ﬁ nancial reports, and other policy papers. Drawing 
on the historical institutionalism literature, the main hypothesis is that the 
evolution of the MFFs follows an incremental path, and no substantial change 
whatsoever is observed with regard to the ﬁ scal capacity of the EU; however, 
the ongoing negotiations with regard to the MFF 2021-2027 can be considered 
as critical, due to the fact that they can produce punctuated dynamics and 
discontinuities, thus change, with regard to the available ﬁ nancial resources for 
speciﬁ c policy ﬁ elds. 
KEY-WORDS: Budget; continuity; European Union; Multi-annual Financial 
Framework; punctuated equilibrium.
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Περίληψη
Τ ο παρόν άρθρο επιχειρεί να εξετάσει το εύρος της δημοσιονομικής ικανότητας της Ε.Ε. εστιάζοντας στα Πολυετή Δημοσιονομικά Πλαίσια (ΠΔΠ). Λαμβά-
νοντας υπ’ όψιν τις πολιτικές που χρηματοδοτεί ο προϋπολογισμός της Ε.Ε., η 
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ανάλυση αντλεί από τα ΠΔΠ 2007-2013 και 2014-2020, συγκρίνοντάς τα με το 
προτεινόμενο από την Επιτροπή ΠΔΠ 2021-2027. Σκοπός είναι η διερεύνηση της 
εξέλιξης των ΠΔΠ αξιοποιώντας εμπειρικά δεδομένα, χρηματοοικονομικές εκθέ-
σεις και άλλα κείμενα πολιτικής. Με βάση τη βιβλιογραφία του ιστορικού νεοθε-
σμισμού η υπόθεση που εξετάζεται είναι ότι η εξέλιξη των ΠΔΠ ακολουθεί αυξητι-
κή τροχιά δίχως να εντοπίζονται ουσιαστικές μεταβολές. Εν τούτοις, οι τρέχουσες 
διαπραγματεύσεις για το ΠΔΠ 2021-2027 εκτιμώνται ως κρίσιμες καθώς μπορεί 
να δημιουργήσουν «ασυνέχειες» και μια δυναμική «διακεκομμένης ισορροπίας», 
προκαλώντας αλλαγή σε ό,τι αφορά τους διαθέσιμους χρηματοδοτικούς πόρους σε 
ορισμένα πεδία πολιτικών.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: διακεκομμένη ισορροπίαž Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωσηž πολυετές δη-
μοσιονομικό πλαίσιοž προϋπολογισμόςž συνέχεια. 
1. Introduction
T he ﬁ nancial perspectives of the European Union (EU) have been part of the political debate about the potential of Europe to deliver sound and coherent 
European public policies since the very creation of the European Economic 
Community (EEC). From late 1980’s, when the multi-annual programming 
periods were put forward (informally until the Lisbon Treaty) as a means of 
tackling dissonances between the member states and coping with organizational 
and functional issues of the EU (i.e. supporting with the necessary ﬁ nancial 
means all EU policies and backing the everyday functioning of the EU) 
disagreements over who gets what, and when have been minimized in terms of 
their frequency. The multi-annual ﬁ nancial perspectives of the EU –currently 
known as the Multi-Annual Financial Framework; MFF– have played a very 
critical role inasmuch as they have reduced uncertainty regarding the amount of 
money the EU will have to raise so as to place it at its disposal for spending; they 
have also increased the capability for EU administration to accurately distribute 
its ﬁ nancial resources over time, thus, predicting its spending capacity.
In May 2018, the European Commission presented its proposals for the 2021-
2027 MFF along with the allocation of expenditures within certain European 
public policy ﬁ elds (European Commission, 2018a). The Commission’s initiative 
signiﬁ ed the launching of budgetary discussions ofﬁ cially held among European 
Union (EU) institutional actors as well as the outset of political procedures with 
regard to the way(s) EU ﬁ nancial resources should be allocated and spent during 
the 2021-2027 programming period. The shift from the 2014-2020 period to the 
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following (2021-2027) constitutes a big challenge for the ﬁ nancial capacity of the 
EU inasmuch as the Union, for the ﬁ rst time in its history, will have to continue 
with one member state less since the United Kingdom (UK) has ofﬁ cially decided 
to withdraw, and to ﬁ nd new resources in order to substitute the losses from the 
UK exit, which has been diachronically among the top net-contributor member 
states to the EU budget.
This paper deals with the ﬁ scal capacity of the EU to deliver European policies 
by utilizing its ﬁ nancial resources. Taking as a starting point of research the fact 
that the MFF has signiﬁ cantly supported the EU to minimize disagreements 
over the budget and increase stability, the paper seeks to identify the evolution 
of the MFF since 2007, taking into consideration the ongoing discussions about 
the formulation of the 2021-2027 MFF. The MFF serves as the variable which is 
depended upon budgetary politics regarding the –often contradictory– member 
states’ interests. The paper draws on the historical institutionalism framework 
so as to examine if MFFs follow an incremental path rather than constitute major 
changes of the EU’s ﬁ nancial capacity, allowing for the Union to increase its 
leverage and deal more effectively with a (constantly) wider range of EU macro-
policies. In this regard, the analysis takes also into thorough consideration the 
creation of punctuated dynamics and discontinuities, thus change on speciﬁ c 
policy areas, since it is argued that they can be the result of budgetary procedures 
that follow an overall incremental path.
2. Literature review
B udgetary negotiations are on the forefront of the “MFF cycle” as intensive discussions and bargains are ofﬁ cially held in the EU ‘melting pot’, whenever 
a MFF is gradually coming to its ofﬁ cially ending. What we call here as “MFF 
cycle” is the seven-year programming period within which member states 
take advantage of the ﬁ nancial resources of the EU and implement projects in 
different policy ﬁ elds, principally in regional and agricultural sectors. 
Interestingly, the literature offers different insights with regard to the 
budgetary process, yet the historical institutionalism serves as a helpful point 
of (theoretical) departure. According to Laffan (2000, p. 725) negotiations for the 
EU budget have occasionally been characterized by political dramas as intensive 
bargains have produced disagreements, tensions between the actors, and ﬁ nally 
deals of the last minute. Laffan (2000) develops a theoretical framework in order 
to describe consecutive budgetary negotiations over time, arguing that the latter 
can gradually be crystallized in formal arrangements which, in turn, alter the 
very nature of the budgetary policy process as informal processes and policy-
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making are substituted by formal rules, norms, and the “logic of appropriateness” 
under the notion of sociological Europeanization (Börzel & Risse, 2003, pp. 65-
67). Ackrill & Kay (2006) discuss the emergence of new institutional structures 
relevant to the EU budget system, so as to allow for the better implementation of 
the EU budget rules in line with the provisions of the EU Treaties. The authors 
offer an interesting conceptualization in trying to explain two apparently opposite 
notions within the historical institutionalism approach –stability and change– 
by applying their ideas on the EU budget and arguing that a new trajectory may 
actually be present within a path dependency process (Ackrill & Kay, 2006). 
Citi (2015) argues about the factors that allow for budget change with re-
gard to the allocation of expenditures. He ﬁ nds that the formulation of winning 
coalitions in the Council, the ideology of the co-legislators and the enlargement 
of the EU to the cohesion countries have played crucial role in reallocations of 
the budget (Citi, 2015). On the contrary, the EU political cycle and the big ne-
gotiation rounds which led to the adoption of the MFFs did not ﬁ nd to alter the 
allocation of resources (ibid.). The author also suggests that despite the fact that 
partisan politics play a very crucial role in the budgetary process, the institu-
tional environment can pose heavy constraints; in fact, this observation is in line 
with the theoretical proposition of Ackrill & Kay (2006) about the signiﬁ cance of 
institutional arrangements. 
Policy stability and change is also examined by Citi (2013; see also Lind-
ner, 2003). In his study, the author examines all the macro-areas of expendi-
ture for the period 1984–2011 and suggests that the evolution of EU policies 
in time in terms of their budget, by and large, follows a continuous and in-
cremental way; however, there are moments in time of discontinuity, where 
only punctuated equilibrium dynamics can explain policy changes in the evolu-
tion of budget for some cases (Citi, 2013, pp. 1167-1169). From another point 
of view, Matilla (2006) focuses on budgetary politics. He examines the ﬁ scal 
transfers and redistribution of resources that the budget allows for, and in par-
ticular the role of the smaller member states with regard to their payments to 
and revenues from the budget. Interestingly, the author ﬁ nds that the smaller 
member states manage to take advantage of their overrepresentation in the 
policy-making process, thus, getting more than they actually contribute in the 
budget (mostly for internal, agricultural and structural spending). Yet, they 
fail to do the same in terms of their contributions to the budget, probably due 
to the own resource system of the EU budget. 
Finally, Kölling (2015) explores the evolution of the MFF over time. The au-
thor focuses on the opportunities that have arisen for subnational mobilization, 
both in ﬁ nancial and regulative terms (Callanan & Tatham, 2014). The study 
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suggests that in the case of the Spanish “comunidades autónomas”, subnational 
authorities have successfully managed to seize the opportunity offered by the 
EU institutional framework so as to effectively represent their interests in the 
budgetary negotiations, by employing a coordination/cooperation strategy with 
the central government (Kölling, 2015).
All in all, the literature on budgetary politics emphasizes on the notion of 
continuity with regard to the allocation of budget appropriations, mostly due to 
the institutional arrangements that favours embedded norms, discussions and 
formal rules to prevail over freely held bargains. However, there also seems to 
exist a few moments of discontinuities (“punctuations”) where some policy areas 
gain more than the usual. In addition, new “actors in town” (sub-state entities) 
may also take advantage of the institutional framework and successfully 
participate in the negotiations. 
3. Continuity or change? Financing European public 
policies on a multi-annual basis
T he ﬁ rst period after the establishment of the EU (1951; European Community of Steel and Coal along with the European Economic Community created 
in 1957) of the EU’s budget is characterized by efforts made towards the 
gradual development of a unitary budgetary system accompanying by the ﬁ rst 
measures for ﬁ nancial autonomy (1953-1975) (European Commission, 2002, p. 
15-16). However, the conﬂ icting diversity of the EU member states’ interests, as 
represented in the Council, along with the tensions and the operating problems 
arisen by unsuccessful negotiations between institutions (European Parliament 
and the Council) created signiﬁ cant problems during the following budgetary 
period for the EU ﬁ nancing system (1975-1987). Respectively, the same period 
has been characterized by continuous disagreements and clashes over the 
Union’s ﬁ nancial resources, the total amount of funds as well as their allocation 
with a view to the Community’s policy priorities, considering the increasing need 
of the EU for stable and sufﬁ cient funding. 
The EU’s initiative to tackle with these problems led, in the summer of 
1988, to the decision to reform the ﬁ nance system by establishing own resources, 
rationalizing the structural funds so as to increase their effectiveness, and 
reinforcing the budgetary discipline. It was that time in the EU budget history that 
the launching –for the ﬁ rst time– of the ﬁ nancial perspectives (1988-1992) as an 
integral part of the budgetary discipline procedure served as the key-arrangement 
for creating harmonious ﬁ nancial management and effectively dealing not only 
with the diverse interests of the member states over a multi-annual period but 
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also with the increasing ﬁ nancial needs of the Community. In other words, it was 
this period of time that punctuated equilibrium dynamics were created, altering 
signiﬁ cantly the budgetary procedure in the sense that the newly established 
own resource system minimized internal conﬂ icts, increased budget revenues and 
allowed for the expansion of developmental or (re)distributional policies, such 
as the structural policy. The following ﬁ nancial perspectives (1993-1999; 2000-
2006) aimed primarily to effectively manage the EU available ﬁ nancial resources 
(revenues side) as well as to balance the allocation of expenditure by means of 
distributing funding in different policy areas. 
However, the 1988 reform on the budgetary procedure served rather as an 
isolated episode of change interrupting a long period of a recurrent processes and 
repeated practices which continued to be reproduced shortly afterwards. In this 
respect, the overall amount of revenues and expenditures as well as the policy 
priorities that followed the ﬁ nancial perspectives of the period 1998-1992 bear 
great resemblance between each other with no signiﬁ cant changes whatsoever. 
For instance, the overall commitments ceiling of the EU budget was set on average 
at (approximately) 1.15% of the Community’s total Gross National Income 
(1993-99: 1.25%; 2000-06: 1.09%; 2007-13:1.12%; 2014-20: 1.13% -excluding the 
UK; European Commission, 2018d). Another incremental characteristic was the 
gradual diminishing share of agriculture and the increasing share of cohesion 
policy in terms of their funding. These traits of continuity and incrementalism 
are easily found, in a similar way, in the “successors” of the ﬁ nancial perspectives 
periods, the ﬁ nancial frameworks of 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 (MFFs). Neither 
the overall amount of funds has been fundamentally changed nor have the policy 
priorities been profoundly modiﬁ ed as the agricultural policy along with the 
cohesion share the vast majority of funds exceeding 70% of the total funding of 
each MFF. Respectively, both the total amount of ﬁ nancial resources as well as 
the distribution of money follows a recurrent pattern of incremental changes with 
little or no radical differences. These thoughts lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The evolution of the MFFs 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 follows 
an incremental path, and no substantial change whatsoever is observed with 
regard to the overall ﬁ scal capacity of the EU.
P. 1a: There are no radical changes over the total amount of EU funding 
resources.
P. 1b: The allocation of funding remains, to a great extend, stable for given 
policy areas and only minor changes are noticeable. 
In addition, the ongoing discussions for the future MFF 2021-2027 based on 
the proposals of the European Commission do not seem to alter the budgetary 
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procedures, the amount of revenues and the allocation of expenditures altogether. 
However, the following three factors should be taken into consideration: a) the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU, a fact which poses signiﬁ cant 
amount of pressures for replacing the UK net contributions to the budget with 
other (equivalent) resources; According to the Commission the withdrawal of the 
UK “may leave a gap of EUR 12-14 billion in the annual EU budget” (European 
Commission, 2018c, p. 13); b) the Commission proposals for imposing new 
taxation over speciﬁ c entrepreneurial activities; c) the Commission proposal for 
the establishment of a discernible and coherent policy ﬁ eld for the single market, 
which will include digital policy and innovation programmes in conjunction 
with the re-allocation of funds between the policy areas. These parameters 
allow for the re-consideration of the incremental way which characterizes the 
budget formulation, in particular for distinct policy areas and their respective 
funding, due to the appearance of punctuated dynamics which, in turn, facilitate 
new arrangements along with recurrent (in)formal rules and practices. In this 
respect, “marginalized” policy ﬁ elds in terms of their respective share of funds 
in the MFFs may by hugely beneﬁ ted from the Commission’s proposal, in sharp 
contrast to other, traditional policy areas which could face radical reductions of 
funds. Thus, the second proposition is summarized as follows:
Proposition 2: The ongoing negotiations with regard to the 2021-2027 MFF 
can produce punctuated equilibrium dynamics through the reallocation of funds 
among given policy areas along with the establishment of new sources for budget 
revenues.
P. 2a: The negotiations for the 2021-2027 MFF can produce discontinuities 
in terms of decreasing the ﬁ nancial resources of traditional EU policy ﬁ elds 
whereas favouring the ﬁ nancial support of –partly– new ﬁ elds.
P. 2b: The acceptance of the proposed new own resource system of revenues 
can critically support the new MFF.
In order to examine the validity of the above propositions the paper focuses 
on comparing the 2007-2013 and 2014-2020 MFFs and contrasting them with 
the proposed MFF 2021-2027. Methodologically, the MFF is considered as the 
variable highly depended on budgetary politics. The article is based on data 
found on the European Commission ﬁ nancial report for the ﬁ scal year 2014 
(MFF 2007-13 & 2014-20) and its proposal about the future ﬁ nancial framework 
(2021-27). Since all data have been provided in constant prices (2011=100 for 
MFF 2007-13 & 2014-20; 2018=100 for the proposed MFF 2021-27) they are 
offered for comparisons. However, it should be mentioned that the reference 
year used for deﬂ ating the MFFs appears to be different in two cases: a) when 
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analysing each MFF separately on a yearly basis, and b) when comparing all the 
MFFs between each others. In the ﬁ rst case, since the analysis focuses on each 
MFF no methodological problem is presented. Yet, methodological restrictions 
are posed when comparing the MFFs as single periods (second case), since the 
base year used for deﬂ ation for the MFF 2021-27 is different (2018=100) than 
its forerunners (2011=100 for MFFs 2007-13 & 2014-20). Likewise, it must 
be emphasized the fact that the Commission’s proposals about the new MFF 
should be treated with some cautiousness altogether. The reason is because the 
European Parliament has criticized the adopted methodology and the way the 
Commission has presented the data, i.e. the inconsistent use of nominal and 
current prices when dealing with the allocation of funds between different policy 
areas, and the absence of a common methodology between the (three) institutions 
(European Parliament, 2018a). Such methods facilitate “obscuring ﬂ exibility” 
tactics on behalf of the Commission1. In line with this critique is the integration 
of the resources of the European Development Fund which adds (by 0.3% of 
the EU GNI) to the commitment appropriation ceiling for the new MFF (it was 
excluded in the MFF 2014-20). Finally, some headings’ names have been slightly 
adjusted in order to reﬂ ect the principal policy ﬁ eld throughout the MFFs, thus 
allowing for juxtaposition of the terminology (i.e. “smart and inclusive growth” 
found on the 2007-13 & 2014-20 MFFs is termed “cohesion policy”; “sustainable 
development, natural resources” is the equivalent of “agricultural policy”; “Global 
Europe” is synonymous with the heading “Neighbourhood and the World” found 
in the proposed MFF 2021-27). 
4. Overview of the period 2007-2027
W hen taking into consideration the three consecutive MFFs so as to get a snapshot of the broader EU ﬁ nancial perspectives, it should be emphasized 
the fact that for the ﬁ rst time a multi-annual ﬁ nancial period (2020-27 MFF) 
provides less resources when comparing with its forerunner (Figure 1). Though 
marginal, the decrease (-3.44%) compared with the previous period (2007-2013) 
is clearly evident and stands in sharp contrast with the argumentation about 
increasing the EU multi-annual ﬁ nancial resources and the respective ceilings 
(both of the commitment appropriations and payments as a share of the EU 
Gross National Income-GNI) so as to better deal with contemporary challenges 
in certain policy areas, i.e. migration, asylum and EU internal affairs in general. 
Figure 1 provides a brief overview of the successive MFFs. The fact that the 
Commission proposes a larger MFF compared with its predecessor(s) is rather 
impressive when considering the withdrawal of the UK from the Union. It should 
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also be mentioned that the proposed MFF takes into account the resources of the 
European Development Fund, something which was not the case for the previous 
MFFs. Respectively, the total amount of funds for the 2021-27 period amounts 
approximately to 1.13 trillion euro. The prospective increase of the funding 
cannot constitute a signiﬁ cant change of the budgetary path since the ceiling 
appropriation is proposed to 1.11% of the EU GNI; the previous MFF ceilings 
had been decided to reach 1.00% (2014-20) and 1.12% (2007-13) of the EU GNI.
Figure 1: MFFs in comparative perspective.
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Source: European Commission (2014, p. 110; 2018c, p. 30); own elaboration (2011=100 for 
MFFs 2007-13 & 2014-20; 2018=100 for MFF 2021-27).
4.1 The MFF 2007-2013
Figure 2 depicts the expenditures of the 2007-2013 MFF. As it is shown, from the 
total 994 billion euro the vast majority of funds are allocated in two major policy 
sectors: agriculture and cohesion. Diachronically, the total amount of money 
spent in these policy areas was more than 85% of the MFF (44.2% the share of 
cohesion; 43% for agriculture), leaving very little ﬁ nancial space for exercising 
other EU policies. The pattern of attributing the vast amount of funding within 
these two policy sectors remained impressively resilient (highly inelastic and 
practically unchanged) during the whole period of the MFF. Expenditures related 
with the international role of the EU were a small proportion of the MFF (less 
than 6%) and the same pertains for security, defence and justice actions (less 
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than 1,5%). The heading “single market” is not evident as a distinct category, yet 
programmes related with innovation and digital market are fragmentally found 
to be funded, particularly on the “cohesion policy” category.
Figure 2: The MFF 2007-13 – Expenditures per year.
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Source: European Commission (2014, p.85; 2004=100) and own elaboration.
4.2 The MFF 2014-2020
The commitment appropriations for the 2014-2020 MFF reached 959,988 
million euro (1.00% of the EU GNI). The funds have been cut by 3.44% when 
compared with the previous period. However, things seem to follow the same 
path as previously as no signiﬁ cant change with regard to the main categories 
of expenditures is evident. Respectively, the vast majority of them –again more 
than 85%– are allocated between the two principal policy ﬁ elds (ﬁ gure 3). 
Taking into account the fact that the MFF 2014-20 has been slightly decreased 
when compared with its predecessor the overall result is the stability over the 
allocation of funds and the continuation of a pattern which focuses on the same 
two policy ﬁ elds. 
Interestingly, the difference of the share of cohesion policy and agriculture 
policy on the MFF seems to increase in favour of the former category when 
compared with the previous MFF: from 1.2% during the 2007-13 MFF the 
difference reaches 8.2% in MFF 2014-20. In fact, the average share of the 
agricultural policy is decreased (38.9%; MFF 2007-13: 43%) whereas the average 
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share of cohesion is increased (from 44.2% in the MFF 2007-13 to currently 
47%), a fact that seems to explicitly mark the priority of the EU over the two 
policy ﬁ elds. Once again, single market programmes are not evident as a distinct 
category, whereas funds for home (internal) affairs and “Global Europe” actions 
only marginally increase their share on the MFF by 0.4% (for each category) in 
comparison with the MFF 2007-13. All in all, the 2014-2020 MFF do not alter 
the grand picture of the previous allocation of funds, in spite of the marginal 
re-allocations, thus, providing evidence of continuity and utter absence of 
substantial changes.
Figure 3: The MFF 2014-20 – Expenditures per year.
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Single market (Digital
market; Innovation)
Compensations
Administration
Global Europe
Security, defence and
justice (home affairs)
Sustainable development -
natural resources
Cohesion policy (smart
growth)
Source: European Commission (2014, p. 200; 2011=100) and own elaboration.
4.3 The MFF 2021-2027
Prima facie, the 2021-27 MFF seems to resemble with its forerunners. The total 
commitment appropriations of the proposed MFF reach the amount of 1,134,583 
million euro (1.11% GNI – EU27). However, a few subtle yet signiﬁ cant 
differences should be pointed out, based on ﬁ gure 4. Firstly, the share of 
funds of the two traditional policy areas over the new multi-annual period is 
proposed to be substantially lowered, and from 85% of the current MFF (2014-
20) is estimated to reach 64.2% of the total expenditure over the next period 
(2021-27), signifying a signiﬁ cant decrease of their respective contribution. The 
proportion of cohesion policy reaches 34.5% of the overall MFF, and agricultural 
policy is proposed to reach approximately 29.7% of the MFF (ﬁ gure 4). Secondly, 
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the category “Single market” represents a unifying and coherent policy ﬁ eld, 
replacing fragmented programmes found on previous MFFs and amounting for 
14.7% of the total MFF 2021-27.
In addition, the share of other policy ﬁ elds is proposed to be considerably 
increased when compared with their previous funding resources. For instance, 
the category “security, defence and justice” is proposed to triple its share (from 
1.2% during MFF 2014-20 is proposed to reach 4.9%). Similarly the proposed 
share for the role of the EU as a global actor (“Global Europe”) accounts for 
approximately 9.6% of the new MFF, implying a signiﬁ cant increase of the 
expenditure that is expected to be attributed to this category. Furthermore, on 
the revenue side of the new MFF, the Commission argues about the need for 
establishing new sources of revenues followed by the introduction of measures 
that would modernize and streamline the current budgetary system. 
Figure 4: The proposed MFF 2021-27 – Expenditures per year.
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In other words, through the proposed MFF the Commission aims to 
partly change the allocation of funds within certain policy ﬁ elds by favouring 
new policy areas at the expense of the two traditional policies (cohesion and 
agriculture). In addition, having considered the withdrawal of the UK, the 
future policy challenges of the EU and the need for sufﬁ cient future ﬁ nancial 
support, the Commission has proposed the establishment of new sources of 
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revenues. The proposed changes both in the revenue and the expenditure side of 
the future MFF raise the question of the likelihood of the proposed MFF (ﬁ gure 
4) to create punctuated dynamics and –at least some– discontinuities in policy 
priorities. Objections about fundamental changes are also raised, in particular 
when recalling of the fact that the MFF history (2007-2020) is characterized by 
stability over time, not only with regard to the available funding but also with 
its distribution between given policy areas as well as with altering the revenue 
system. Then, how likely is the appearance of discontinuities and changes over 
the new MFF period?
5. Comparing and contrasting the MFFs: “Plus ça change, 
plus c›est la même chose”? 
T he Reﬂ ection Paper on EU ﬁ nances was a strong reminder of the need for reforming the EU budget (European Commission, 2017). However, with 
hindsight the EU budgetary system has not changed signiﬁ cantly since late 
1990s (European Commission, 2018b, p. 5), and this could be partly attributed 
to inter-institutional disagreements and clashes between the main actors: the 
Council, the Parliament and the Commission. Indeed, the decision-making 
process over the MFFs allows for the interplay between the key institutional 
actors involved in the budgetary procedure (Laffan & Lindner, 2010). With a 
view to the MFF 2021-27, and in spite of the institutional actors’ different views 
(i.e. the view of the Parliament over the suggested signiﬁ cant cuts on cohesion 
and agriculture for the period 2021-2027), it is argued that it can constitute a 
“window of opportunity” for change over the new ﬁ nancial framework. 
With a view to the MFFs 2007-13 and 2014-20 is can be easily noticed that 
the predominant characteristic is stability over the total available amount of 
funding as well as its allocation on policy areas (priorities). Agriculture and 
cohesion absorb most of the available funding (over 85% on each MFF). When 
comparing the two successive MFFs it is evident that cohesion policy increases 
its (absolute and relative) share whereas agriculture loses money; yet, the vast 
sharing of the two policies on the respective MFFs, do not radically change 
but rather in a marginal way. The same pertains for the other categories of 
expenditures (internal affairs; global Europe; administration) as their respective 
proportions do not signiﬁ cantly alter during the period 2007-2020. 
In other words, the multi-annul ﬁ nancial periods 2007-13 and 2014-2020 
provide evidence of an incremental way of budget development regarding the 
respective MFFs: when comparing them, the total amount of available funds 
is slightly decreased during the MFF 2014-20. In addition, only minor changes 
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are put into effect when considering the commitment appropriations for each 
category, even for the major ones –cohesion and agriculture– despite their 
opposite results (increase for cohesion and decrease for agriculture). In fact, some 
of the observed changes regarding the allocation of funds are almost unnoticed 
(i.e. 0.4% increase for home affairs and global Europe in the MFF 2014-20). For 
these reasons, stability in the sense of long-term continuity, is the predominant 
trait when contrasting the two successive MFFs (2007-13 & 2014-20), thus, 
afﬁ rming the propositions 1a and 1b.
On the other hand, the period 2021-27 seems to be offered for testing the 
propositions of punctuated dynamics that lead to small yet highly discernible 
changes (P. 2a and P. 2b), and perhaps to new policy trajectories. In general, the 
period 2021-2027 allows for two different observations: the ﬁ rst is relevant with 
the revenue side of the proposed MFF, whereas the second with the allocation of 
funding. With regard to the revenues side, the Commission has proposed a mix of 
new and partly revised own proposals which may add to –or partly replace– the 
predominant source of budget revenue, the GNI (European Commission, 2018c, 
p. 34). The very idea of the Commission lays on the fact that by decreasing the 
share of the GNI to the EU budget and expanding the mix of revenues would 
facilitate the implementation of EU policies (ibid., p. 33). Respectively, the 
European Parliament (2018b, p. 4) suggests that: “unless the Council agrees to 
signiﬁ cantly increase the level of its national contributions to the EU budget, 
the introduction of new genuine EU own resources remains the only option 
for adequately ﬁ nancing the next MFF”. More speciﬁ cally, the Commission’s 
proposals (European Commission, 2018c) include the establishment of three 
new own resources: a) a common consolidated corporate tax base; b) an own 
resource based on the auctioning revenue from the EU emissions trading 
system; c) an own resource contribution based on plastic packaging waste (not 
recycled). In addition, the Commission emphasized on the streamlining of other 
sources of budget revenues such as the simpliﬁ cation of value added tax-based 
contributions, the eradication of corrections (i.e., the reduced call rate for the 
value added tax for speciﬁ c countries and the corrections attributed to the UK) 
as well as the imposition of a new source of revenue based on the taxation of 
ﬁ nancial transactions. Since the EU lacks the institutional power to impose 
taxes and due to the fact that unanimity is a precondition for the acceptance of 
the aforementioned proposals, negotiations in the Council is the tool for reaching 
agreements over the proposals. 
Turning the focus of interest on the other side of the MFF 2021-27, the 
proposed allocation of expenditures seems to follow an overall incremental 
path. For instance, the ‘grand picture’ reveals that the total commitment 
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appropriations do no radically change, as the proposed ones reach 1.11% of the 
EU GNI (table 1). The proposed total sum of expenditures is 1,134.6 billion euro; 
though data are expressed in different constant prices when compared with the 
two previous MFFs, one could argue –in general– that the total sum of money 
has not radically changed from the past. 
The digital policy offers an exemplary case of the pattern of continuity. Over 
the last decade the EU has increasingly identiﬁ ed the necessity to promote the 
digital transformation of the European society and economy in order to stimulate 
growth, employment and completeness. In 2015 the European Commission has 
adopted its proposal for the creation of a Digital Single Market as the main 
priority of its Digital Agenda and committed itself to allocate all the necessary 
ﬁ nancial and regulatory resources to make it a reality. This commitment is 
clearly identiﬁ ed in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027. 
For the ﬁ rst time, in comparison with the previous MFFs, funds have been 
earmarked for the EU digital policy and the term “digital” made its appearance 
in one of the seven chapters of the Financial Framework, the one called “Single 
Market, Innovation and Digital”. 
In addition, for the ﬁ rst time the European Commission has proposed 
the launching of a €9.2 billion dedicated programme, the Digital Europe 
Programme (DEP), to support the deployment of digital capacities of the Union 
(artiﬁ cial intelligence, super-computing, cyber-security, advanced digital skills 
and e-government). However, despite the fact that a dedicated programme is 
being proposed, the European Commission seems to avoid aggregating a large 
amount of funds in this new ﬁ nancial instrument and instead opts to maintain 
and enhance its “traditional” sources of funding. Thus, an almost 9-fold increase 
of investments in digital transformation, approximately 12 billion euro, is 
proposed through the new Horizon Europe Programme, an increase of 166% 
to reach 3 billion euro is anticipated through the Connecting Europe Facility – 
Digital Connectivity, 1.1 billion are allocated through Creative Europe MEDIA 
programme and a large amount of funds is anticipated under the objectives 
“Smarter Europe” and “A more connected Europe” of the European Regional 
Development and Cohesion Funds for the support of the digital transformation 
of the economy at regional level.
So, it can be noted that at this point of the process the increase of resources 
for the needs of the EU digital policy is not the result of a radical expansion  of the 
proposed MFF but rather the result of the shift away of the European Commission 
from the cohesion policy towards other policy areas such as “the single market, 
innovation and digital”. In addition, the launch of a new dedicated programme 
with limited capacity, following the example of Horizon programme and the 
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simultaneous increase of the provisions of the “traditional” sources of funding 
of the digital policy, shows a path dependence of the European Commission over 
its previous channel of funding. Finally, it adds a new means to the already 
large number of ﬁ nancial instruments lending credence to the criticism about 
overlapping actions in the digital area and innovation (European Parliament, 
2018b). It worths mentioning that the ﬁ rst opinion of the Scrutiny Board of the 
European Commission was negative and there was lack of a clear explanation on 
how the programme will interact with other existing programmes, in particular 
with the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (FP9).
From another point of view, when delving into the new MFF some differences 
are more discernable and may constitute signiﬁ cant change from the past. For 
instance, regarding the “home affairs” policy area, the resources available for 
the European Defence Fund are proposed to be multiplied (more than twenty 
times) reaching a budget of 817 million euro (European Commission, 2018c, p. 
16). Similarly, the establishment of budgetary instruments for stabilizing the 
euro area when its business cycle is contracted or its economy is on recession, 
along with their complementary function with other EU funds (including the 
European Structural and Investment Funds) represents a rather radical change 
of policy measures when compared with the capacity of the past MFFs to deal 
with situations of economic turbulence.
In addition, when focusing on speciﬁ c policy areas and ﬁ nancial instruments 
it should be mentioned that the Erasmus programme is proposed to signiﬁ cantly 
beneﬁ ted by doubling its budget (from 14.7 billion euro to 30 billion euro); From 
a reverse point of view, yet with the same implications, agriculture and cohesion 
are proposed to ‘suffer’ cuts in their budgets (their share is proposed to fall from 
over 85% during the 2014-20 MFF to less than 65% in the future period). The 
proposed decrease constitute a radical departure from a recurrent pattern which 
had placed these policies at the very (ﬁ nancial) centre of successive MFFs2. The 
above claims seem to attest propositions 2a and 2b. 
Figure 5 presents the allocation of the absolute amount of funds for the 
successive MFFs. Figure 6 shows the respective relative shares (%) of each policy 
ﬁ eld. Table 1 summarizes the discussion about the shares of the policy ﬁ elds 
within the three MFFs.
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Figure 5: MFFs in comparative perspective (in absolute numbers).
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Figure 6: MFFs in comparative perspective (in %).
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Table 1: Summary of the distribution of funds per policy ﬁ eld 
within the MFFs.
MFF
Policy area 2007-2013 2014-2020 2021-2027
Cohesion policy (smart growth; inclusiveness) 44,2% 47,0% 34,5%
Sustainable development – natural resources 43,0% 38,9% 29,7%
Security, defense and justice (home affairs) 1,2% 1,6% 4,9%
Global Europe 5,7% 6,1% 9,6%
Administration 5,8% 6,4% 6,7%
Compensations 0,1% 0,0% 0,0%
Single market (Digital market; innovation) 0,0% 0,0% 14,7%
Total commitment appropriations 
(as a % of the EU GNI)
1.12% 1.00% 1.11%*
Source: European Commission (2014, p. 110; 2018c, p. 25) and own elaboration; 2011=100 for 
MFFs 2007-13 & 2014-20; 2018=100 for MFF 2021-27; *European Development Fund (0.03%) 
is included.
In a nutshell, the overall picture of the three consecutive MFFs seems to follow 
an overwhelming pattern of continuity. This is highly evident particularly when 
considering the stability of the total commitment appropriations as expressed 
by the EU GNI (table 1). Yet, the analysis tried to reveal that with regard to the 
2021-27 MFF there are a few (proposed) small ‘episodes’ of change in given policy 
areas which seem to digress from the main incremental path of its forerunners 
(MFF 2007-13 & 2014-20). In this respect, not only the pattern of continuity 
but also proposed changes in the 2021-27 MFF are in line with empirical 
ﬁ ndings about the formulation of the EU budget. Should the proposed ‘episodes’ 
of change survive through the negotiations for the future MFF between the 
three institutions, the moments of discontinuity, when punctuated equilibrium 
dynamics are produced and explain changes in the evolution of budget for speciﬁ c 
cases (Citi, 2013, pp. 1167-1169) as well as the reveal of new trajectories within a 
path dependency process (Ackrill & Kay, 2006) will be afﬁ rmed under the 2021-
2027 MFF; otherwise, the pattern of continuity is highly likely to utterly prevail 
–once again– at the end of the negotiations regarding the ﬁ nal amount for funds 
allocated to the EU policies. In any case, future research based on solid data 
and ﬁ nalized reports of the institutions could, unquestioningly, provide better 
information about the degree of incrementalism of the 2021-27 MFF.
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6. Conclusion
T he MFF is aiming primarily at raising the general status of living of the EU population by tackling disparities, promoting public and private 
investments and fostering growth and development. Despite its relatively 
small share as expressed by the EU GNI (approximately 1.1%) its impact on 
formulating coherent EU public policies is considerable. This paper examined 
three consecutive MFFs (2007-13; 2014-20; 2021-27) with the objective to 
compare and contrast them. The main hypothesis was that the evolution of the 
MFFs follows an incremental path and in spite of the emergence of critical points 
in time, no substantial change whatsoever is observed with regard to the overall 
ﬁ scal capacity of the EU to ﬁ nance its policies. 
The ﬁ ndings revealed an overwhelming pattern of continuity throughout the 
successive MFFs. However, the ongoing negotiations with regard to the 2021-
2027 MFF and the proposals of the European Commission, despite the existence 
of methodological problems with regard to the consistency of the provided data, 
can create ‘episodes’ of punctuated equilibrium through the reallocation of 
funds among given policy areas, along with the establishment of new sources 
of revenues. These small ‘episodes’ can occur as long as the Commission’s 
proposal for certain policy areas will be accepted by the other institutions, i.e. 
the radical cuts on agriculture and cohesion or the multiplication of funds for the 
defence sector; should they be accepted, new policy trajectories may be revealed, 
yet without radically altering the overall ‘big picture’ of the MFFs’ continuity 
over time. Future research could provide solid information about the degree of 
incrementalism of the 2021-27 MFF.
Endnotes
1  We wish to thank George Andreou, Assistant Professor at the Aristotle Uni-
versity of Thessaloniki, for his comment on this point.
2  It should be mentioned that the European Parliament (2018a) criticized the 
Commission on the basis that the cuts it has proposed on the two policies 
have been presented to be signiﬁ cantly lower, ranging between 5%-7%. Re-
spectively, the European Parliament estimates the cuts between 10%-15% 
for each sector. The analysis of the data provided in this paper does not allow 
for unbiased comparisons of the 2021-27 MFF with its predecessors since the 
base year for deﬂ ating the data differs.
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